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 Kenneth J. Gergen
 Textual Considerations in the
 Scientific Construction of Human Character
 Molding character from the culture's repositories of discourse is a pre-
 carious undertaking. For accounts of character- what it is to be a coherent and
 identifiable person- are first of all possessions of the populace. They are central
 constituents of the ordinary language conventions and, as a result, intimately
 intertwined in daily patterns of human relationship. Thus, when people speak
 of their intentions, beliefs, wants, hopes, fears, and the like, they are not only
 generating and solidifying agreements concerning the ontology of personal
 being, they are also carrying out patterns of relationship in which such terms
 are essential integers. (The utterance "I adore you" not only asserts a certain
 condition- adoration- to be a central essence of human beings, but simulta-
 neously participates in a form of relatedness that equally determines what it
 is to be human.) The writer's position is thus precarious in two senses: first
 with respect to his/her symbiotic relationship with the existing language com-
 munities and second with respect to the life forms that such writing may either
 disturb or destroy.1
 It is the first of these conditions that is central to the major arguments
 of the present paper. The inscription of character is critical not only for nov-
 elists, biographers, and autobiographers; it is also of pivotal importance to
 historians, political scientists, legal theorists, philosophers of knowledge, psy-
 chologists, and many others. All are challenged with the problem of rendering
 in words a sense of recognition- mutuality yet difference. At the same time,
 in all these cases the writer is faced with a subtle but consequential problem:
 he or she must rely on the discursive forestructure supplied by the culture and
 yet perishes by its repetition. In this sense, the literary creation of personhood
 is inevitably intertextual (or more precisely, interdiscursive); the writer must
 rely on the existing argots of understanding or else ceases to be intelligible. To
 write of someone who "feels pickle" or who "wishes in the horizontal" fails
 in the cooperative achievement of making sense. At the same time, to repro-
 duce the existing forestructure is to fail in generating moments of distinction
 in the ongoing hurly-burly of daily activity. If the writer does not estrange the
 audience from the commonplace, he or she can make no claim to voice. At
 worst, the writer simply expands the domain of tedium.
 My particular concern in this paper is with the way in which literary
 considerations enter into the construction of human character in scientific
 psychology. How is it that the professional psychologist, as a writer, navigates
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 between the shoals of the banal and the absurd? The problem is interesting
 from several standpoints. While rhetorical analysis has traditionally centered
 on the writing of fiction, the fiction writer occupies a very specialized role
 within the culture. And, although this role does undergo historical change, it
 has long been defined in terms of its liberty. That is, violations of the rules of
 common intelligibility are anticipated- or even desired for the forms of en-
 tertainment, enlightenment, or escape which they allow. Thus, along with other
 rhetorical processes, analyses of character formulation in fictional writing may
 be misleading if generalized to other forms of literary construction. Indeed, as
 rhetorical consciousness has expanded in recent years, analysts have become
 increasingly concerned with the literary dimensions of the various human
 sciences. Historian Hayden White's Tropics of Discourse , Donald McClosky's
 The Rhetoric of Economics, Bruno Latouťs Science in Action , and James Clif-
 ford and George Marcus's Writing Culture , along with sociological works by
 Bryan Green ( Literary Methods and Sociological Theory) and the psychiatri-
 cally oriented writings of Donald Spence ( Narrative Truth and Historical
 Truth), Richard Harvey Brown {Society as Text), and Patrick Mahony {Freud
 as Writer ), are among the most visible works of this genre. The present analysis
 extends this line of endeavor to inquire, most particularly, into the scientific
 psychologist's construction of character.2
 In light of the role played by scientific psychology within the culture,
 such an excursion takes on special significance. For as traditionally reasoned,
 the rigorous and objective study of mental processes should ultimately lend
 itself to an enhanced quality of cultural life. With greater knowledge of the
 emotions, thought processes, memory, motivation, personality dispositions,
 and the like, we should be able to make more informed decisions concerning
 educational practices, child rearing, career choice, and a host of other matters
 including the care and prevention of mental disorders. Even the literary critic
 might benefit from such knowledge, many argue, for adequacy of textual in-
 terpretation should be assessed against the standard of what we know objec-
 tively about the minds of authors. In effect, scientific accounts of mental pro-
 cesses are candidates for truth status, and to achieve truth is to claim superiority
 over (and thus to marginalize) all competing forms of discourse.
 Yet, regardless of the extent and rigor of the research practices, the re-
 sulting account is a linguistic construction. The scientific text must create an
 intelligible sense of personhood according to existing conventions of writing.
 No less than the novelist, the psychologist must employ techniques of literary
 construction to render scientific accounts acceptable. Most importantly, to the
 extent that such techniques dominate the scientific account, observational prac-
 tices-regardless of rigor- cease to be influential. Methods of experimentation,
 systematic measurement, and sophisticated statistical devices lose their power
 of warrant. They neither control the discursive rendering of "the subject," nor
 do they justify it. Thus, to penetrate the literary devices for creating character
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 within the psychological literature simultaneously undermines the objectivity
 of such accounts and serves as a means for liberating the otherwise margin-
 alized discourses.
 The present attempt is not to assay the full range of rhetorical techniques
 in current use. Rather, more modestly I shall outline three sources of constraint
 in the writings of professional psychology and the way in which these con-
 straints enter into the fashioning of character. I will direct attention first to
 issues deriving from the psychologist's membership in the culture at large, then
 to problems emerging within the scientific subculture, and finally to the textual
 requirements of laboratory practice. To echo the initial refrain, my special
 concern in each case is with the psychologist's attempt, within current confines
 of scientific discourse, to equilibrate between the opposing necessities of con-
 ventionality and originality.
 Creating Character in Cultural Context
 The psychologist's ultimate challenge is to present a compelling picture
 of human functioning to an audience whose lifelong effort has been that of
 functioning humanly. For the most part, people are relatively secure in their
 "knowledge of personal character" and will cite their everyday adequacies as
 proof of their discernment. Of course, professional psychologists are no less
 members of the culture at large, and as a result they share in the common
 conceptions of personhood. It is indeed just this background which enables
 them ultimately to meet the challenge of intelligibility. In the same way that
 seventeenth-century vicar Robert Burton could turn commonsense beliefs in
 melancholy into a 500-page treatise on the causes and cures of this affliction,
 psychologists of today enter the laboratory already committed to the belief
 that persons possess rational thought, emotion, memory, and the like. The
 culture's ontology of personhood is seldom brought into question, and thus
 the psychologist's accounts are typically congenial to the surrounding ethos.3
 It is in this context that one is sensitized to the subtle shifts in the profes-
 sional construction of the person occurring over the past century. As I have
 tried to describe elsewhere, nineteenth-century romanticism revitalized and
 refashioned the medieval "reality of the deep interior." That is, the literary,
 musical, architectural, and artistic ventures of the time conspired to define the
 person in terms of a deep energie force, often equated with soul and rooted
 in both the spiritual and natural world. It was the expressions of the deep
 interior, whether in terms of inspiration, devotion, grief, or moral commit-
 ment, that gave personal being its significance. These suppositions are, of
 course, reflected in the character of major protagonists of romantic novels.
 And in psychology, it is this cultural context that served both to stimulate and
 to render intelligible Freud's theory of the unconscious. Without the fore-
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 structure of romantic discourse (see Lancelot Whyte's The Unconscious Before
 Freud), psychoanalytic theory could have neither been penned nor prolifer-
 ated.4
 Yet, in the twentieth century, as romanticism has been replaced by the
 Zeitgeist of modernity, the deep interior recedes from view. In modern psy-
 chology curricula, Freudian theory receives but scant attention (often viewed
 as a historic relic or relevant only to circumscribed problems of mental health).
 In the scientific laboratories Freudian theory is remarkable for its absence. For
 in the modernist culture, we find a prevalent return to Enlightenment as-
 sumptions of human functioning. Within the present century, the deep interior
 as the core around which character is constructed has largely been replaced
 by what we believe to be the more accessible processes of observation and
 reason. That is, persons are rendered intelligible as persons primarily by virtue
 of their experiences and thoughts. It is reason and observation that, in the
 modernist vein, lead to essential knowledge or understanding, not only in the
 domains of science, but also in the visual arts, architecture, music, dance, and
 so on. And it is on the powers of reason and observation that we can rely for
 continued progress and prosperity (see, for example, J. F. Lyotard's account
 of the modernist narrative of progress).
 The psychological sciences have drawn from this same repository of cul-
 tural beliefs in their fashioning of the twentieth-century being. The two most
 central lines of research within the mainstream have explored, first, the process
 of learning (through observation) and, second, information processing (the
 character of thought). The works of J. B. Watson, Ivan Pavlov (as popularized
 within the United States), B. F. Skinner, and Clark Hull were canonical texts
 within the realm of learning. All were concerned with the processes by which
 individuals acquired fundamental knowledge of the world. All served to inform
 the reader that the individual is defined in terms of his/her capacities to know
 and adapt. The emphasis on learning has been replaced in recent years by
 concerns with information processing (termed by Howard Gardner and others
 "the cognitive revolution" in psychology). The enormous research literature
 on processes of attention, comprehension, cognitive heuristics, information
 storage, and memory systems signifies to the culture that the critical ingredients
 of human character are processes of thought.
 Yet, to declare that the common suppositions about human nature are
 true is simply to assert that psychological accounts have been appropriately
 constrained by the dominant intelligibilities. The psychologist would simply
 murmur assent to that which everyone knows and thus fail in the task of
 generating new knowledge. This leaves open the question of transcendence-
 how the profession secures voice by moving beyond the commonplace. In my
 view, where successful, this end is largely accomplished through métonymie
 implication. That is, elements of the common vernacular are used as token
 parts of more general but unarticulated wholes. By elaborating the holistic
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 images or units implied by the fragments, the scientific psychologist retains
 the commonsense conventions, but offers what is effectively a fresh body of
 insights. Thus, for example, to speak commonly of persons "knowing their
 way around" and having a "good sense of direction" is, by implication, to
 suggest a more inclusive image of the individual as possessor of some form
 of map. Given the more general emphasis within modernist culture on pro-
 cesses of reasoning, the resulting theory is felicitously cast in terms of "cog-
 nitive mapping." Thus, researchers from Charles Tolman in the 1930s to eco-
 logical psychologists of the 1980s offer to the culture a corpus of theory (and
 supportive research) on the nature of cognitive maps (see, for example, Ulric
 Neisser's volume, Cognition and Reality). Such theorizing is intelligible largely
 because it relies, at base, on the commonsense conventions. However, in its
 fuller elaboration of the image implied by these conventions, it carries the
 sense of an original scientific contribution.
 There are two features of this process worthy of special attention, the
 first involving psychology in the expansion of the cultural definition of per-
 sonhood and the second in its constriction. In the former case, once the theorist
 has established the general image suggested by various fragments of sedimented
 discourse, its implicature may be explored by a process of propositional un-
 packing. That is, given a central image or metaphor of the human being, the
 task is to develop deductively an array of corollary propositions. By unpacking
 the implicational network, the theorist advances a new array of propositions
 about human nature not directly contained in the common language. For
 example, one of the most rhetorically powerful images in the recent psycho-
 logical literature is that of the mind as computational device, or form of com-
 puter. The metaphor is invited by numerous commonsense accounts of persons
 who "calculate," "carry information in their heads," "possess memories," and
 so on. However, once in place, the theorist can flesh out the picture of the
 human being in terms of discourse borrowed from the domain of computer
 technology. Current theories, for example, treat such topics as feature detection,
 information storage, storage capacity, working memory, information retrieval,
 semantic codes, sensory storage, and encoding processes- none of which were
 initially part of the commonsense idiom, but which may become so as the
 psychologist's constructions of character gain status as knowledge.
 At the same time the elaboration of the dominant images leads to fresh
 conceptualizations of the person, there is also a way in which the profession
 circumscribes the cultural construction of character. In their natural habitat,
 that of informal communal life, the signifiers of personal character are subject
 to continuous catachresis. Fragments of person description may be inserted
 into various and newly emerging contexts without risk of social sanction. Or,
 in Derridian terms, the signifiers enjoy a relatively high degree of freedom,
 and thus, the destiny and complexity of traces are constantly expanding. How-
 ever, once the scientific psychologist has appropriated the cultural argot, sealed
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 it within the confines of a particular image, and disseminated the language to
 the culture in the form of "scientific knowledge," the cultural signifiers are
 thereby constrained. Thus, for example, as the profession increasingly defines
 human character in terms of the computer, common terms such as "calculate,"
 "plan," and "think" lose their connotative richness. To "think about it," for
 example, is no longer a matter of "seeking inspiration from within" (one con-
 notative trace for such a phrase), but of "accessing programs of propositional
 logic"- just as a properly programmed computer would do. Not only is lin-
 guistic flexibility lost in this definitional fixing, but as the computer metaphor
 is normalized, such terms as "spirit," "passion," "soul," "creativity," "mood,"
 and "lust" become moribund. They are inconsistent with the dominant im-
 agery of mind as computer and thus irrelevant to understanding human char-
 acter.
 Character in the Context of Scientific Culture
 Social scientists are not only members of the culture at large, but of
 particular guilds or "interpretive communities" within the general milieu.
 These communities possess histories of textual formulation, internal under-
 standings of the nature of human character. And to the extent that the scientist
 is to be intelligible, he or she must construct character within the constraints
 of these traditions. There are a number of stories to be told about such con-
 straints and their violation. However, there is one of special relevance to what
 many take to be the breakdown of the empiricist tradition in recent decades,
 along with the associated deterioration of boundaries between science and art
 (fact and fiction, reality and myth, the literal and the metaphoric). It is again
 a story of equilibrating between convention and counterconvention in the
 construction of character. Its special interest lies in the irony of outcome. For
 in the very attempt to transcend the consensus view, psychologists have suc-
 ceeded in subverting the foundational view of empiricist scientists. In gener-
 ating "pleasures of the text," they have undermined the very warrant of the
 text as objective.
 To begin the tale, scientific psychologists have shared with the scientific
 community at large a particular view of the character of the scientist. This
 view, largely constructed within logical empiricist philosophy, paints a heroic
 picture of the scientist. In dramatic terms, the scientist is one whose skills in
 observation and reason enable him (as feminist critics point out, the role is
 traditionally gendered) to step outside the vagaries of common opinion and
 political prejudice, to press beyond the frontiers of the unknown, and to fetch
 truth from the lands of mystery. (The similarity between this vision of the
 scientist-hero and Campbell's account of the heroic monomyth is hardly ac-
 cidental.) In effect, by virtue of their training in the sciences, professional
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 psychologists enter the research arena with a vision of the ideal character. And
 this intelligibility places significant constraints over the kind of portrayals that
 can be made of the human being within the research setting.5
 Given the close association between the empiricist construction of sci-
 entific character and twentieth-century modernism, the previous comments
 regarding the centrality of learning and cognition in psychology are apposite.
 Scientific psychology could not, in this sense, vindicate a romanticist view of
 human functioning because such a view is contrary to the image of the heroic
 scientist. For the hero-scientist to prove through reason and observation that
 people's rationality and perceptions are governed by unconscious, irrational
 forces is to undo the very image that sustains the scientific endeavor. It was
 virtually incumbent upon scientific psychologists, then, to develop a picture
 of human functioning that celebrated reason and observation. The work of
 personality psychologist George Kelly nicely illustrates this attempt to har-
 monize the scientist's picture of himself with his accounts of human character
 more generally. In one passage of A Theory of Personality , Kelly attempts to
 replace the romantic view of the deeply driven being with a précis to his theory
 of personal cognition:
 Let us then . . . have a look at man-the-scientist. . . . When we speak of man-the-scientist
 we are speaking of all mankind and not merely a particular class of men who have publicly
 attained the stature of "scientists." ... It is customary to say that the scientist's ultimate
 aim is to predict and control. This is a summary statement that psychologists frequently
 like to quote in characterizing their own aspirations. Yet, curiously enough, psychologists
 rarely credit the human subjects in their experiments with having similar aspirations. It is
 as though the psychologist were saying to himself, "I, being a psychologist , and therefore a
 scientist , am performing this experiment in order to improve the prediction and control of
 certain human phenomena; but my subject, being merely a human organism, is obviously
 propelled by inexorable drives welling up within him." . . . Now what would happen if we
 were to reopen the question of human motivation and use our long-range view of man to
 infer just what it is that sets the course of his endeavor? Would we see his centuried progress
 in terms of appetites, tissue needs or sex impulses? Or might he, in this perspective, show
 a massive drift of quite a different sort? Might not the individual man, each in his own
 personal way, assume more of the stature of a scientist, ever seeking to predict and control
 the course of events with which he is involved? Would he not have his theories, test his
 hypotheses, and weigh his experimental evidence? (4-5)
 Kelly goes on to build his theory of human functioning on the basis of the
 latter assumption.
 Yet, if the social scientist simply feeds back to the scientific community
 variations of its own image, he/she will ultimately be rendered invisible. The-
 oretical characterizations of the person merely recycle "what all good scientists
 already know." The central problem for the theorist, then, is that of transcend-
 ing the common intelligibility of the scientific community while simultane-
 ously sustaining it. This problem is largely solved through the procedure of
 propositional unpacking described earlier. That is, scientific research is dedi-
 cated to elucidating one or more of the ancillary propositions, consistent with
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 the dominant metaphor, but not a direct duplicate. Thus, for example, all of
 the above cited topics central to the cognitive psychologist are consistent with
 the more general myth of the rational scientist at work. They are sufficiently
 fresh that they appear to carry new knowledge; at base, however, they sustain
 the myth of the heroic scientist.
 It is at just this juncture, however, that the seeds of subversion are in-
 advertently sown. For as the implicature is extended and new bodies of dis-
 course are appropriated, so do the boundaries of the dominant metaphor be-
 come fuzzy. Its initial meanings become distorted, diffused, and eventually
 threatened by opposing images. Or, in the Derridian sense, as the traces of the
 initial signified are extended, one reaches a point at which the signifier is
 deconstructed. It is precisely this unravelling of the prevailing metaphor that
 has helped to undermine the empiricist conception of the scientist (and thus
 the privilege of scientific discourse).
 More specifically, as the metaphor of the individual as computational
 device has been progressively unpacked in various research settings, an in-
 creasing array of proactive attributes have been assigned to the individual.
 The individual has become one who actively searches for solutions, scans
 memory, formulates and carries out plans, processes information, and so on,
 all according to internal design. As it is commonly put, human beings are
 driven by "top down" (rationality operating on the world) as opposed to "bot-
 tom up" (the world determining what is rational) processes. However, as the
 individual qua computer becomes increasingly automaton or top-down in char-
 acter, the environment is marginalized. That is, it becomes difficult to speak
 of the individual as sensitive to or observant of the real world because what
 constitutes the objective environment is determined by the internal operations
 of the computerlike individual. Reality within the machine is that which is
 allowed or determined by machine configuration. It is in this sense that An-
 thony Greenwald has characterized the cognitive system as "totalitarian" (63).
 That is, it is closed to the influence of other voices, seeking only to sustain its
 own position.
 Yet, as should be obvious at this point, to the extent that humans are
 portrayed as automatonlike computers, top-down in their determination of
 "what is the case," the traditional image of the scientist-hero cannot be sus-
 tained. For within the newly emerging story scientists no longer search for and
 reveal the nature of the unknown; rather, they can only reveal in their writings
 the character of their machine operations. They do not record and reflect the
 world as it is, but as their own systemic properties require. Thus, in the very
 attempt to sustain and elaborate the image of the human being as rational
 agent, the traditional concept of rationality- with successful adaptation to ex-
 isting circumstances at its cores- is undone. The wholly rational character
 proves irrational.
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 Human Character in the Laboratory Context
 There is a third set of constraints governing the construction of character
 in scientific psychology, one that emerges within the context of systematic
 exploration. Empirical scientists claim warrant for their words largely on the
 basis of methodological procedures. In particular, it is the controlled experi-
 ment that enables the "behavior of organisms" (from single cells to entire
 societies) to be traced to their causal sources in an objectively rigorous way.
 As commonly proposed, by observing behavior in systematically varying con-
 ditions, the scientist can trace the causal connections between antecedents and
 consequents in a precise and replicable way. In whatever way human character
 is constructed within scientific psychology, its contours must be congenial with
 this central, justificatory text.
 Indeed, one can trace the various ways in which this forestructure of
 methodological intelligibility drives the psychologist's portrayals of human
 nature. Thus, for example, the conception of the experiment is one in which
 "subjects" are exposed to "stimuli," which stimuli operate as "causal condi-
 tions." Actions of the subject in experimental conditions are viewed as "re-
 sponses" caused by the stimuli. For many, the resulting characterization of
 the human proves morally problematic because this view of methodology vir-
 tually obliterates the discourse of voluntarism. Because "stimulus conditions
 cause responses," the scientist cannot conclude that subjects voluntarily choose
 their subsequent actions. A voluntary impulse would essentially operate as an
 uncaused cause and thus fall outside the ontological underpinnings of the
 method. It is in this respect that C. Hampton-Turner has written:
 It is not that . . . investigators themselves have a savage eye, but rather that their predicting
 and controlling tools demand the predictable and controllable man in order to consummate
 the Good Experiment. And what a misery the man turns out to be. The highly respected
 Dr. Jekyll discovers Mr. Hyde, the beast in man uncovered by inhuman instruments. (4)
 In the same vein, Gerd Gigerenzer and David Murray have demonstrated in
 their Cognition as Intuitive Statistics how prevailing concepts of statistical
 logic, inherent features of experimental procedure, ultimately serve as the basis
 for theories of human cognition. As they propose, the scientists' statistical
 tools, which "are considered to be indispensable and prestigious, lend them-
 selves to transformation into metaphors of mind" (3). Methodology inscribes
 itself on human character.
 Yet, rather than repeating further the rhythm of the preceding sections,
 I invite a deviation which allows the present thesis to be laminated in yet
 another way. For, as the initial question can be rephrased, how can the scientific
 psychologist render an alien language believable? If the science is to make an
 original contribution, which entails the novel construction of character, how
 is it to be credible in terms of the common idioms through which the world
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 is understood? I have offered a partial answer to this question above, but by
 focusing on methodological procedures, I will attempt to expand the horizons.
 These methodological procedures do provide the psychologist warrant for
 voice. However, they do not do so in terms of foundational rationality, ren-
 dering the scientific account superior in mimetic capacities. Rather, they do
 so in terms of rhetorical power.6 It is the text of experimental procedure that
 ultimately serves to vivify or render realistic the otherwise arcane argot of the
 theorist. Through methodological procedures, the language of the absurd is
 transformed into plausible understandings of human nature.
 To illustrate the process by which this ontological transformation is ac-
 complished, it is useful to consider a single text from the scientific annals. The
 text in this case is a standard research report (Bandura et al.) appearing in a
 recent issue of one of the most prestigious journals in psychology, the Journal
 of Personality and Social Psychology . The research was conducted at one of
 the nation's most outstanding psychological laboratories (Stanford University),
 and its funding provided by the National Institute for Mental Health and the
 National Science Foundation. At the outset, the title of the research report,
 "Perceived Self-Efficacy in Coping with Cognitive Stressors and Opioid Ac-
 tivation," informs the reader that its contents will reveal the secrets of an
 otherwise mysterious or unknown world. The terms rely very little on the
 commonsense vernacular, and their very impenetrability suggests that only
 the serious scientist will be able to appreciate their significance.
 From the present perspective, it is the authors' major task to lend to the
 alien theoretical discourse a sense of palpable reality, that is, to secure the
 reader's assent that "yes, this language does describe events in the actual and
 commonly knowable world." The accomplishment is no small challenge in the
 present case, for in their abstract or decontextualized form, such theoretical
 terms as "perceived self-efficacy" and "cognitive stressors" are hopelessly am-
 biguous. "Perceived" by whom- a person, friends and acquaintances, the psy-
 chologist? And is "perception" to be understood in the sense of direct sensation,
 deductive categorization, interpretation, intuition, or something else? And is
 saying it is "perceived" to suggest that it is not truly known, as in "the perceived
 world" as opposed to "the actual world"? And what of the term "self-efficacy"?
 Is this the bodily self, the spiritual self, the unconscious self, the voluntary
 self, or something else? And is efficacy to be read as "achievement," "impact,"
 "power," "result-producing," or in some other way ? Similarly, the term "cog-
 nitive" suggests thinking, perceiving, remembering, intending, planning, and
 a variety of other possibilities: are they all intended; how are we to select
 among them? And are these cognitions conscious or unconscious, motivated
 or unmotivated, desirable or undesirable? Again the matter is ambiguous.
 Similarly, the term "stressor" succumbs to a variety of interpretations (phys-
 ically straining, bending, shaping, rendering more flexible, and so on). And,
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 of course, each of these translations bears the traces of other signifiers in an
 ever-expanding array of undecidable signification.
 The introductory section of the research report provides the initial as-
 surance that there is indeed an objective datum (a signified) to which the
 theoretical terms refer. Two rhetorical processes function in this capacity, the
 first social corroboration and the second conceptual elaboration. The corro-
 borative function is carried out largely through citations of other scientific
 reports that claim familiarity with the states in question. The most directly
 relevant studies are those carried out in the same laboratory, suggesting that
 this location is privileged in its access to the phenomenon in question. Yet to
 cite only the work of the single laboratory is to cast doubt on the existence of
 the phenomenon. A multiplicity of additional citations thus serves to assuage
 residual doubt. As the reader is told, for example, "Findings of different lines
 of research underscore the influential role of perceived control in stress re-
 actions (A veril, 1973; Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Miller, 1980)." And so
 secure is the existence of the phenomenon, according to the report, that re-
 search has also succeeded in qualifying or extending knowledge of its precise
 operations. As one learns, for example, "in some studies of controllability,
 merely the exercise of personal control over the occurrence of aversive events
 without curtailing their intensity reduces stress reactions (Gunnar-von-
 Gnechten, 1978)." Yet, in the end, these many supporting documents prove
 inadequate, for in the authors' terms, "The foregoing studies have relied on
 plausible presumptive mediation inferred from the manipulations rather than
 on direct assessment . . . ." Or in terms of the scientist-hero metaphor, the
 other scientists did not really see the mysterious phenomenon; they were
 merely speculating from their results.7
 In addition to garnering social corroboration through citations (a tech-
 nique that has similarly served the cited authors), additional credibility is lent
 to the exotic language through conceptual elaboration. Primarily through par-
 aphrasings, the authors begin to reduce the opacity of the theoretical terms.
 At times the paraphrasing moves toward the common language. The reader
 learns, for example, that "Perceived self-efficacy is concerned with beliefs in
 one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses
 of action needed to meet given situational demands." The fact that a definition
 is given in more or less comprehensible terms has the rhetorical effect of
 securing the existence of the phenomenon. If we are uncertain that X exists,
 it is fortifying to learn that, in fact, X = a presumably existing Y. (The more
 suspicious reader might inquire further into the precise identity of Y- other
 than the equivalence of the mysterious X. In the above, for example, what is
 it to "mobilize motivation"? Is this to consume more calories, give oneself
 pep talks, thrust oneself into adrenalin-producing situations, or something
 else?) In other locations in the introductory section, the conceptual elaboration
 of the sacred terminology is largely removed from the domain of daily language.
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 For example, few outside the sacrosanct community of knowers would com-
 prehend the definition of cognitive stress: "Psychological stress is the result of
 a relational condition in which perceived environmental demands strain or
 exceed perceived coping capabilities in domains of personal import." The
 words are teeming with profundity- "stress," "demands," "strain," "exceed,"
 "coping"- but do little to disambiguate the putative phenomenon.
 Far more significant in the achievement of ontological transformation is
 the second section of the report, "Method." Here scientists report on the pro-
 cedures used to carry out their investigations. These reports are written in
 plaintalk or literal language of the kind that would enable other scientists to
 replicate (and thus evaluate objectively) the featured research. Most important
 for present purposes, investigators report in everyday language the means by
 which the theoretically specified phenomenon is assessed or established. These
 definitional linkages (typically called "operational definitions") thus furnish a
 direct equation in which X (in the exotic language) = Y (in the everyday
 vernacular). In this way the reader is informed that the otherwise mystifying
 theoretical language is actually reducible to commonly known, wholly palpable
 matters of fact. It is thus in the present manuscript that we learn that "perceived
 self-efficacy" is a state established by placing college students in a "mathe-
 matical problem-solving task" for 18 minutes. "High perceived self-efficacy"
 occurs when the students can work at their own speed at a set of arithmetic
 problems; "low perceived self-efficacy" takes place when the problems are
 presented to students more rapidly than normally required for completion.
 The state is measured by a questionnaire in which the students are asked to
 rate their certainty in completing the problems. Similarly, "cognitive stress"
 is assessed by a questionnaire in which students are asked how much "stress"
 and how much "mental strain from time pressure" they experienced. Thus the
 alien discourse becomes intimate- now a constituent of the comfortably in-
 telligible surrounds.
 Yet ontological transformation is not yet complete, for if the theoretical
 language remained tied to mundane operations, it could easily be rendered
 superfluous. Why, one might ask, is the theoretical language essential if all is
 intelligible in the common language? The third section of the manuscript,
 carrying the results of the investigation, serves as a hedge against such queries.
 For in this section the operational or everyday language of the preceding section
 is progressively abandoned or suppressed. Increasingly the researchers slip back
 into the uncommon or exotic vernacular. We learn, for example, that "Per-
 ceived self-inefficacious subjects showed a heightened heart rate, whereas the
 perceived self-efficacious ones displayed a marked decline in heart rate." In
 the plaintalk idiom it might be said that the hearts of those faced with solving
 problems at a rapid rate pounded faster than those working at their own speed.
 However, this form of account never appears. However, through a definitional
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 borrowing from the plaintalk account, the exotic language becomes increasingly
 real.
 The present research study is exceptional in its objectification of the
 mental terminology, for it goes on to demonstrate a causal link between the
 mental and the material world. Because the material world is commonly ac-
 cepted as objective within modernist culture and the ontological status of psy-
 chological terminologies is suspect, then to demonstrate that psychological
 states act on physical states is to solidify the existence of psychological states.
 The possibly subjective (and thereby discreditable) becomes objective. This
 "causal connection" is established in the present instance by demonstrating
 that depending on their perceptions of self-efficacy, a psychological state, sub-
 jects are more or less susceptible to a chemical, naloxone, that blocks opiate
 (pain-reducing) receptors (a physical state). This account treats perceived self-
 efficacy as an independent reality, not at this point reducible to work on math-
 ematical tasks.
 In the final section of the paper, the "Discussion," the ontological trans-
 formation is made complete. For here the commonplace intelligibilities are
 virtually forgotten. The reader has previously learned that the alien language
 refers to palpable events, reducible to the commonly known. Now that the
 linkage is established, it is possible to speak almost wholly within the novel
 ontology. The reader is confidently told, for example, that "The results of the
 present experiment provide evidence that perceived self-efficacy in coping with
 cognitive stressors activates endogenous opioid systems." The reality of the
 new ontology is further extended by relating it to other exotic but scientifically
 acceptable accounts. And finally, to inject the newly created reality with ev-
 eryday significance, its implications for personal health are outlined: "A grow-
 ing body of evidence reveals that the stress of coping inefficacy . . . impairs
 cellular components of the immune system." The newly molded character,
 replete with perceptions of self-efficacy, is now readied by the laboratory lit-
 erature to venture forth and cope with cognitive stressors of the world.
 To conclude, the scientist no less than the writer of fiction is engaged in
 the literary process of rendering human character both interesting and intel-
 ligible. By focusing on the character of these problems and the means by which
 they are solved within the human sciences, the traditional privilege of mimesis
 accorded to the scientist is threatened. If it is to be retained, the distinction
 between "factual" and "fictional" accounts of human character must be lodged
 in other discursive criteria (e.g., political, ideological, historical). Further, var-
 ious forms of literary criticism that derive their warrant or justification from
 scientific accounts of human character (or quasi-scientific, as in the case of
 psychoanalytic theory) thereby lose their justificatory base. For the warrant in
 such cases proves to be little more than another form of text. Whether the
 present analysis relies as well on unarticulated conceptions of human character
 remains open to further assessment.
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 Notes
 1 For critical assessments of the effects of psychological discourse on cultural life,
 see, for example, the work of Edward Sampson, Henderikus Stam, and Julian Henriques
 and his colleagues.
 2 The present paper thus extends my earlier incursions into the uses of narrative
 and metaphor in constructing the identity of persons.
 3 For a more extended account of current assumptions of personhood and their
 historical origins, see Amelie Rorty's Mind in Action (1988).
 4 In this sense one may view the present-day attempt to interpret literature or
 other cultural symbols in terms of unconscious process- for example, Kaja Silverman's
 The Subject of Semiotics (1983)- as a twentieth-century recapitulation of a nineteenth-
 century conception of the person.
 5 As Weston and Knapp (93) point out, this view has also been incorporated into
 the way in which literary criticism represents the scientist and thus limits, as well, the
 way scientific thinking is presented in fictional texts.
 6 The previously cited works of White, McClosky, Clifford and Marcus, and Latour
 are all consistent with this contention. However, as Paisley Livingston's Literary Knowl-
 edge makes clear, the contention is controversial.
 7 See also Latour's discussion of the function of citations in creating the sense of
 objectivity.
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